As part of its mission to increase knowledge and understanding of  North Africa, the Maghreb Center is dedicated to supporting the study and exploration of the region’s history, culture, as well as political and economic issues. This blog features Maghreb Center interns and students’ commentaries and research work that reflect the Center’s commitment to expanding the discussion on this important region of the world.

WE WELCOME SUDENTS’ CONTRIBUTIONS !

If you want to submit a paper, an article, or an essay, please send an email to administration@maghrebcenter.org, with ”MC Student Blog Contribution” as a subject.

by Edsel Tupaz & Joan Martinez, JURIST – Sidebar, Jan. 10, 2012, http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/tupaz-martinez-tunisia.php

First, a caveat: while constitutional design does seem to be important for stability and longevity for democracy, it is only one factor among many. A solid constitutional design is by no means a guarantee against instability; external factors, as well as internal implementation and the establishment of a supportive civil society are essential for a successful system.[1] However, rules create incentives for behavior. They can encourage strong parties or weak ones, many parties or few, a more or less authoritarian government, a moderate government or a radical one. In this way, the governmental structure established through the constitution affects the health of the resultant democracy.

There are two main elements of democratic design to consider. The first is a presidential versus a parliamentary system. Second is a proportionally representative versus single member district legislature. Each of these systems has additional nuances, some of which I will discuss.

Presidential versus Parliamentary

In parliamentary systems, the legislature selects the executive, which depends on legislative confidence, and the executive consists of a cabinet of co-decision makers; whereas, in a presidential system, the people (directly or indirectly) elect the executive separately from the legislature, and the executive consists of an individual with his or her advisers.[2]  In general, scholars support a parliamentary system over a presidential one; they worry presidential systems foster zero-sum competition, lead to deadlock between executive and legislative branches, and encourage personalist leadership.[3] However, each system has its own advantages: presidential systems can increase accountability, as presidents are less likely to be able to attribute mistakes to coalition partners. However, presidential systems can vary dramatically, making it is difficult to generalize.[4] On the other hand, parliamentary systems avoid “lame-duck” executives and empower more experienced party members, rather than “dark horse” presidents who manage to garner popular support.[5]

Perhaps the greatest concern, especially for the North African countries at hand, is the propensity for presidents to concentrate power in the executive. This often happens because the executive is solely controlled by a single party, and because presidents tend to be continually reelected. An incumbent president is more likely than not to be reelected (chances of 1.3:1), while the opposite is true of prime ministers (chances of 0.66:1).[6] One way of countering this affect is to institute term limits. Term limits necessitated more than 70 percent of the changes of presidents internationally between 1946 and 1996.[7] This indicates the power of an incumbent in a popular election, in that presidents often do not leave office until it is constitutionally required. This statistic also raises awareness about the problem of accountability; term limits relieve presidents of accountability to the public in their final term. Thus in a system that seeks to maintain low executive power, a parliamentary system is preferable.

In Egypt, a presidential system would likely empower the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the party promises not to run a candidate for president in the first election, after constitutional reforms are in place this promise no longer holds.[8] The Brotherhood’s candidate would likely win by a plurality if the secular parties do not unite behind a single candidate. If they do, this will stifle healthy dissent between secular parties who would benefit from spending these first years establishing strong, independent platforms.

If, instead, Egypt institutes a parliamentary system, a coalition of moderate, probably secular, parties will likely form the government.[9]  Notably, worries earlier this year about the Turkish AKP winning a super majority in parliament were based on the projection that the AKP would reform the constitution to create a presidency, which would then give them more control.[10] This fear demonstrates that presidencies can empower one party at the expense of others. Thus, conforming to most scholarly analysis, it would be best for Egypt to establish a parliamentary system without a president.

As the Egyptian system stands now, a president will be elected after parliamentary elections. However, when the parliament appoints a council to rewrite the constitution, the rules will change and new elections will be held.[11] Hopefully, this new system will not continue the presidential system.

In Tunisia, it is difficult to make predictions, as more than half of Tunisians do not know which party they will support, according to a recent Al Jazeera poll; even the prominent Al Nahda has support from a little over 20 percent of the population.[12] A presidential system in Tunisia would likely face many of same the problems as it would in Egypt. Tunisia’s history with undemocratic presidencies will probably deter Tunisians from taking that path. As in Egypt, a parliamentary system would likely allow more moderate parties to form a coalition and control government – a result that is more likely to promote long-term stability. According to the same Al Jazeera poll, most Tunisians want a parliamentary system.[13] The American Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, in a speech to Tunisian conference on the new constitution, said that the American model is not transposable to Tunisia,[14] in a nod to the need for a less authoritarian system in the country.

Proportional Representation (PR) versus Single Member District (SMD)

Proportionally representative systems (PR) allow parties to run a list of candidates in a district – or nationally – on which individuals vote. The legislature is then composed of candidates from the parties in proportion to the number of votes they received. In the Single Member District system (SMD), each district represents an individual. Thus the legislature overall may or may not have the same proportional composition as the general population.

PR tends to encourage small parties, whereas SMD tends to repress them. The United States, under an SMD system, has only two main parties; whereas, Israel, under the PR system, had twelve parties represented in the legislature in 2009.[15] There are many nuances of each of these systems: some systems require quotas for certain groups, like women or religious minorities. Some PR systems require a threshold number of votes in order for a party to gain parliamentary seats (in Turkey, the high threshold of 10% gives the larger parties more seats than is proportional).[16] Some PR systems have “closed” lists, meaning voters cannot vote for individuals within the party list, while others give voters more choice through “open” lists. Each of these factors influences the political system.

Many countries have implemented mixed systems, with both a PR and a SMD element. In 2000, 30 countries had mixed systems, and about half of all post-communist countries were using a mixed system; in most cases, the system had two separate votes, one in SMD and the other for PR representatives.[17] The constitutional designers assumed that the two incentives from each system would balance each other out: PR would produce national parties that would build coalitions, while SMD would reduce proliferation of parties from PR. However, countries with mixed systems had more fragmented party competition than those with pure PR alone because small parties were introduced through regional elections. SMD essentially operated against the threshold imposed in PR.[18]

Prominent political scientist Arend Lijphart argues that well-established democracies tend to have fewer than six main political parties.[19] Too many parties make compromise difficult and governance unstable. Young democracies tend to face this problem: the 1991 elections in Bulgaria fielded 21 main parties, and Poland in saw 17.[20] Egypt and Tunisia are both struggling to build stable democratic systems. Egypt has already seen dozens of parties register,[21] and more than 80 political parties are registered in Tunisia.[22] Many of these parties are now joining together. Egypt’s SCAF has proposed a mixed system for the first parliamentary elections in the fall. Overwhelmingly, Egypt’s political parties reject the mixed system and argue instead for a PR system alone. They argue that SMD elections perpetuate corruption and cronyism,[23] problems which Egypt must work particularly hard to eliminate. Therefore, once it has formed, the constituent assembly should change the electoral system to embrace a PR system alone.

Additionally, the SCAF’s proposed elections has a threshold of only 0.5% and a quota of 50% for workers and farmers. Both will be harmful for the parliament and should be overturned in the coming reforms: The low threshold will allow many small parties into the parliament, which, at over 500 seats, will already be so large as to be unwieldy.[24] Lijphart argues that, as a guideline, thresholds of around 3% tend to work best for democracies.[25] Mubarak’s administration abused the quota for workers to appoint its own deputies to parliament.[26] If elections are truly free and honest, such a quota would be unnecessary.

Tunisia’s new electoral system will follow a single, closed-list proportional method to appoint the National Constituent Assembly, which will rewrite the constitution. This simple electoral system will serve the country well and should be maintained. Additionally, Tunisia has instituted an unprecedented quota of 50% for women in the Assembly.[27]

There are many additional questions for these young democracies to answer in designing their democratic systems. Electoral systems are complicated: first past the post and majority run-off are two methods that can have big impacts.[28] Usually, young democracies follow a pattern: They design their electoral systems with little study of other countries, and get preoccupied with short-term, partisan benefits at the expense of long-term goals.[29] Therefore, above all, this paper seeks to encourage an academic study of the democratic systems that these states may implement so that these important debates will not become co-opted by actors seeking personal gains.

There are a few general lessons for constitutional design from Rein Taagepera, a professor emeritus from the University of California Irvine, which will prove useful for Egypt’s and Tunisia’s young governments: First, make electoral rules simple. This way, people know how to strategize within the system, thereby avoiding unpredictable results. You can make adjustments (that tend to complicate the system) later. Second, learn from others’ experiences – unfortunately few new governments consult other nations. Third, generally keep the same rules for at least three elections. People have to develop the skills to use the rules and develop a functioning system around them. Fourth, and lastly, change rules incrementally, so as to be sure you’re making the right adjustments, and to be sure you don’t do too much.[30]

These words of advice caution reformers in Tunisia and Egypt from expecting a perfect system to emerge immediately. Realistic expectations account for shortcomings, both in the rules – demanding reform – and outside the rules, which sometimes requires time to allow society to fix itself. Constitutional reforms could mean very little without the development of a strong civil society with the tools to use the law; each society will require time to flush out corruption and establish a new system that operates with integrity. External institutions like think tanks and lobby groups are also important contributors and take time to develop.

HISTORY OF EUROPEAN POLICY:

European cooperation on migration began in the early 1970s and has slowly been gaining momentum.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the European Union (EU) involvement in migration policy-making consisted primarily of advice to North African governments and was not based on legal requirements. This changed with the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on May 1, 1999.  The agreement empowered the European Commission to draft binding legislation on migration and asylum issues.  Since then, the notion of a partnership between the EU and the Maghreb has been explored primarily via EU regional policies.  After that, two influential multilateral forums to discuss issues of migration and asylum in the Maghreb emerged: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the “5+5” Western Mediterranean Dialogue.[2]

The EU-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, has its origins in Cooperation Agreements signed between Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the EU (then called the European Common Market) in the 1970s.  The Barcelona Process is based on new Association Agreements that were signed with each participating country – Tunisia in 1995, Morocco in 1996, and Algeria in 2002.  All three Association Agreements identify illegal immigration as a main problem in the area of migration, but each agreement offers different solutions.  In the Moroccan and Tunisian agreements the Maghreb is seen as a principal source area of migration and argues that more development means less migration.  The Algerian agreement focuses on readmission of Algerian nationals, which is not mentioned in either the Moroccan or Tunisian agreements.[3]

The economic policy is the most detailed and comprehensive aspect of the Barcelona Process.  New policies based on principles of various forms of economic integration are included, but this is not extended to the free movement of labor.  Further, borders are preserved for both economic and political reasons.  Therefore, the Barcelona Process failed to resolve the inherent cContradiction between closer economic cooperation and the persistence of political division, which made controlling migration more or less a failure.   However, the failure to control migration was not the only failure of the Barcelona Process.[4]

The other important aspect of Europe’s policy in North Africa is referred to as “5+5”, which offers a possibility for group discussion and meetings that bring together officials from France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.  The initial “5+5” conference was held in 1990 but meetings faded with the embargo placed against Libya in 1992.  Meetings were reinstalled again in May 2002 and the last conference was held in September 2004.[5]

POLICY PRE-ARAB SPRING:

The most recent stage in the EU’s Mediterranean policy, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), picks up where the Barcelona Process and “5+5” discussions left off.  The ENP is rooted in Action Plans that are written for countries on an individual basis.  Morocco and Tunisia’s Action Plans were both written in December of 2004.  Readmission of migrants and concerns regarding visas remain key issues that are addressed in both Action Plans.[6]  “The succession of documents, from the Association of Agreements in the mid-1990s to the 2004 European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans, reveals a developing vision of the Maghreb as the most important region of origin for illegal migration, then as a transit region for illegal migrants and finally as a transit region for potential refugees,” states Collyer.[7]

THE ARAB SPRING AND EUROPE’S RESPONSE:

The current revolutions, which are part of the Arab Spring, have forced Europe to reconsider how it views the Maghreb as it has resulted in an intense immigration debate within the EU.  The debate highlights multiple issues.  First, the recent economic crisis has emphasized anti-immigration resentment across the EU.  Second, Europeans were faced with the potential of Libya sending scores of Libyans, other North Africans, and sub-Saharan African refugees.  Third, Europeans are struggling with ethnic tensions with the existing immigrant minorities and feel saturated with asylum-seekers.  In reality though, the number of potential migrants and refugees turned out to be lower than expected.[8]

There have been several responses by the European Union.  The European Commission published its original suggestions on a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with North Africa on March 8^th and the proposals were endorsed by the European Councils later on in the same month.  The proposal formed the framework of Europe’s initial policy response to the migration crisis, which is based on three pillars: democratic transformation and institution-building, fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and corruption; support to civil society, enhanced opportunities for exchanges; and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development.[9]

The next step was for the EU to respond to the harder side of policy on migration – a discussion of the Schengen space.[10]  One initial suggestion on this latter aspect came from Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Mamstroem who suggested the introduction of internal border controls.[11]  This essentially is a call to eradicate the Schengen space, which allows for crossing of most borders within Europe for work or pleasure without going through a border cross point.[12]  Another solution was put to EU ministers May 12, 2011 and to a summit in late June and proposed intensify policing of the EU’s external frontiers and the creation of a European system of border guards.[13]

The European Commission released a new response after the summit held on May 12^th that puts forth the highest level of engagement that is politically feasible at the time being and rethinks the ENP.  First, the response provides a much stronger commitment to supporting political reform, pluralism, and processes that may lead to democratization via focused objectives and benchmarks that were jointly negotiated with partner governments.  Second, the EU proposes to have increased attention to NGOs through a new Civil Society Facility and by creating a new Endowment for Democracy.  The latter would serve as a grant-making body for non-registered NGOs and political parties.  Third, it has been proposed to support reform efforts and reward those making the most progress with renewed incentives of money, market access, and mobility partnerships. [14]

In regards to money, the EU decided to pledge another 1.2 billion Euros to the region in addition to the previously pledged 5.7 billion Euros.  Also, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will look to add another 2 to 2.5 billion Euros a year, each year, over the next few years.  Lastly in regards to money, the EU has decided to push the European Investment Bank to work with others in order to add another billion Euros a year.  For mobility, the EU has decided to offer support so that young people and business people can take full advantage of education and business opportunities in the EU.  Lastly in regards to market access, the EU will further support the region via trade[15].

SEPARATE RESPONSES FROM FRANCE AND ITALY:

Actions by individual states have also been taken.  For example, France responded to the crisis by stopping trains from Italy carrying immigrants by citing risks to public order.[16]  An Italian-French summit in Rome on April 27^th also called for Schengen’s rules to be revised so European governments can more easily reinstate border controls.  However, when the two countries cosigned a letter, not much was proposed that had not already been by foreseen by the European Commission.  Italy also had to back down on internal border controls than they desired in order to gain support for its call for greater solidarity on the issue.  The further border controls are reinstalled the more Italy will have to bear the burden of the tide of migrants from North Africa by itself, as it is the main entry point into Europe for Tunisia and Libya and some Sub-Saharan African countries.  Italy accepted the compromise because France recognized that eventually a more even burden-sharing should be achieved and Italy acknowledged that in normal years France absorbs five times as many migrants as Italy per year.[17]

CONCLUSION – WHERE EUROPE SHOULD FOCUS ITS POLICY:

An emphasis on internal and external borders, however, will not solve Europe’s qualms over the migration crisis and other solutions will provide better long-lasting results.  First and foremost, Europe should help ensure a stable transition in the region.  This should include the following:

1. Aiding security sector reform to restore security to the region
2. Providing assistance in attracting foreign investment by reducing debt to create jobs
3. Sharing experience and expertise in creating the main pillars of democracy[18]

In regards to the second point, it is important that this job creation is particularly focused on creating jobs for the youth.

Second, a focus on controlling the level of emigration must be exchanged for a focus on removing the ills of the region that led to the revolutions and increased emigration.  This includes:

1. A further and improved emphasis on economic development
2. Support for better education and training

The first point will help establish positive incentives and practical means for potential migrants to remain at home.[19]  This economic development, however, must include more attention towards the less fortunate regions rather than a focus simply on the capital and big cities.  Economists must also play a larger role in the policy decision-making process.[20]

(An event organized by the United States Institute of Peace in Washington DC on 7/25/2011 with Major General Said Elassar (Assistant to Egyptian Defense Minister, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), who discussed the role and goals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) as the transition to democracy continues in Egypt.  The following statement is taken from the conversation held with Major General Elassar at USIP.)

First, the SCAF was not prepared to run the country for a long period of time.  Thus, its role in post-Mubarak Egypt has been a difficult challenge, and patience is needed from both the SCAF and the people of Egypt.  While decisions appear to be slow to the public, the SCAF has had to draw from social, security, and economic policy experts as the SCAF lacks expertise in these fields.  However, the SCAF is not just listening to experts and has been meeting with various youth groups and opposition movements.  Further, the SCAF is being confronted with various agendas and demands.  Because some contradict each other, not all demands can be met, and the SCAF has to decide how to best meet as many demands as possible. The SCAF will continue to try to satisfy the wants of the people of Egypt, and meet their demands as much as possible.

In regards to the upcoming elections and the constitution, the SCAF has responded to the request that the age to be an eligible member of parliament be reduced from 30 years of age to 25.  Also, the SCAF has agreed that the committee in charge of overseeing the elections will be composed of judges only.  However, the SCAF has chosen to refuse the international monitoring of the elections and it is the right of the SCAF to make such a decision.  The SCAF is committed to having the elections be 100% fair, and this is a commitment made to the people of Egypt.

Having a free and fair election means that if the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to democracy and following the rule of law then they have the right to participate politically.  In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood’s party was approved by the SCAF because the party is not seeking to enforce religion on the country, and has become more moderate day by day.  The party has also been interacting in a positive fashion within larger political coalitions.

Further, the SCAF understands that the elected parliament will draft the constitution, and that the president will be elected based on the new constitution.  Therefore, the SCAF agrees that it will have no say and has no right to a say in the drafting of the new constitution.  This means that the SCAF is ready and willing to accept whatever role the constitution assigns the armed forces.

For the funding of civil society, there are laws in Egypt on how to provide money to local NGOs but these laws are being violated by foreigners.  As a result, the SCAF is worried about foreign funds that are coming from the EU, the U.S., and some Arab states.  The SCAF welcomes support from the international community – but not interference – and to have money enter the country legally.  The SCAF is providing money to registered NGOs according to the law.

In conclusion, the SCAF is not an extension of the old regime and is not seeking political authority.  Therefore, the SCAF wants to expedite the election process as much as possible.

Egypt

In Egypt, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), made plans to hold a parliamentary election in the fall, after which the elected parliament will select a body to rewrite the constitution. Some fear this system will empower Islamists, who may win a substantial majority in the parliamentary elections. These dissenters advocate constitutional reforms now, before the government holds parliamentary elections. On June 9^th, a coalition of human rights groups voiced concerns that the SCAF was operating undemocratically: the SCAF had proposed several democratic referenda to the 1971 Constitution in March, all of which passed overwhelmingly. After their passage, the SCAF scrapped the old constitution and rewrote the new referenda as essentially a new constitution, without putting it up for a revote.[1] These groups and others are calling upon the SCAF to follow Tunisia’s model and appoint a body to rewrite the constitution before parliamentary elections.

Tunisia

Some may see Tunisia’s process as exemplary, but it also faces challenges. Tunisia’s interim government decided to set a date for the election of constituent assembly – a kind of second transitional government – which will act as an interim legislative body and write a new constitution. The people will then vote according to the new constitution. The government scheduled the constituent assembly elections for July 24^th, but later postponed them until October 23^rd at the insistence of new, smaller parties who asked for more time to organize.[2] In frustration, the largest Islamist party, Al-Nahda, pulled out of the elections committee. This demonstrates that the divide between liberals – often secularists – and conservatives – often Islamists – continues to grow in Tunisia.[3]

Morocco

Morocco’s president Muhammad VI proposed a series of constitutional reforms on June 17^th in response to the February 20^th Movement. The Movement, named for the date of the first large protest this year, is led by Moroccans from across the political spectrum, from liberals and human rights activists to Islamists, all calling for democratic reforms. Under the previous constitution, the king had absolute control over all branches of government; the legislature served as a democratic façade on an absolutist regime. In the days after the proposed reforms, protestors again took to the streets, calling the reforms insufficient. But on July 1^st, 98.5% of the population approved the referenda.[4]  The new constitution recognized Morocco as a Muslim state while also guaranteeing the free practice of religion to all faiths.[5] It also recognized the Berber population’s native language, Amazigh, as an official language of the state.[6] Women will have “civic and social” equality with men, rather than the former guarantee of “political” equality.[7] The prime minister will now be elected, rather than chosen by the king, giving the government more independence. The referenda also give new powers to parliament, as well as some reforms to the judiciary (though it is still part of the executive branch);[8] however, the king is still a religious leader and controls security and “strategic major policy choices,” according to a report by the Carnegie Endowment.[9] The referenda do not define the parameters of these major choices, effectively leaving the king unlimited power, if he chooses to use it. Praise and criticism has come from all sides; some call the referenda a positive step toward a democratic transition, while others call it an attempt to placate the protestors and prevent the kind of unrest that much of the Arab World has seen this spring.

Expect a post coming soon analyzing potential new democratic systems for these three countries in light of academic studies of constitutional theory.

(An event organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington DC on 7/11/2011)

Enders Wimbush (Senior Director, Foreign Policy & Civil Society, German Marshall Fund of the United States) began the discussion by pointing out that 73% of Moroccans turned out on July 1^st to vote on the constitution and 98.5% of those Moroccans voted yes for the proposed constitution.  The international media has remained fairly divided on the issue stating that there are lots of challenges and risks that remain and that this is just one small step forward, but it is a courageous one.

Driss El Yazimi, a member of the Moroccan Council for Constitutional Reform and a long-time human rights activist in France, compared commonalities and differences in countries affected by the Arab Spring.  Three commonalities are the issue of the young people, the public visibility of women asking for rights, and the emergence of individuals – of people acting as individuals and not on behalf of the king, a tribe, or a political party – especially through new, online media.  Unique to Morocco is its old monarchy, pluralistic population, active civil society, and that it began the process of reform before the Arab Spring.  Two examples of this last point are the Family Law of 2004 and the establishment of the National Human Rights Council.  In addition, some elements of the new constitution were debated before the Arab Spring as well.  However, there are three long-term challenges facing Morocco: employing youth, reforming education and training to fit the demands of the job market, and fighting corruption.  Thus, while reform has been made, more is needed.  The constitution serves as a new step in the reform process.

Leila Hanafi, from the World Justice Project, argued that the main challenge is increasing civic engagement and the rule of law.  The real test of the new constitution will be whether ordinary Moroccans can participate in decisions that affect them. The main question for young people is how to strengthen citizens’ awareness with regard to their legal rights and to use the rule of law to protect and defend themselves.  Thus, the key is to build confidence in the system amongst citizens and be actively engaged, particularly for the youth.  In general, a bottom-up approach is needed; an emphasis should be placed on youth civil society groups.  In fact, young people are very interested in building their leadership skills to ensure they are engaged in the right way.

David Kramer, the president of Freedom House, started his presentation introducing Morocco in a global context; while it ranks as relatively free, its press ranks as one of the most controlled. But he stated that while there is need for further change in Morocco, there has been progress over the last few years that have been ignored to some extent.  For instance, the progress made over the last few years to increase freedoms has been taken for granted.  Also, the King deserves great credit for his relatively peaceful response to the protestors, especially compared to other leaders’ violent reactions. It was notable that the protestors called for reform, not revolution. However, there are strengths and weaknesses to the new constitution.  Strengths of the constitution include individual rights and more power for parliament.  Weaknesses include the amount of powers the King retains and the lack of independence for the judiciary.  Mr. Kramer emphasized the importance of strengthening journalistic integrity as a check on government activity. He also mentioned the need to ensure a level playing field for all political parties, increase the independence of the judiciary, address the issue of Western Sahara, and fight corruption.

Jennifer Bubke (Spring and Summer 2011 Maghreb Center Intern)

                &

Colleen McCullough (Summer 2011 Maghreb Center Intern)

 In the wake of the revolution in Tunisia, many in the West, and in Tunisia itself, fear that Islamist parties will use the resultant power vacuum as an opportunity to gain significant political influence. This fear, though not unfounded, is often tainted by a misunderstanding of the complexities of Islamism in Tunisia. Tunisia has proven itself to be resistant to radical Islamism: since the 1950’s, it has taken some successful steps towards economic reforms and women’s rights, albeit through secular dictatorships who also suppressed free speech. Although Al-Nahda and other Islamist parties may seek to repeal some of these steps, they would also be a long awaited representation of the peoples’ wishes. These considerations make it imperative that Western powers understand the need for Islamist parties like Al-Nahda in the new political system.

Tunisia’s history reveals a commitment to women’s rights unmatched in the rest of the Arab World. Soon after Tunisia’s independence in 1956, the nation implemented the Code of Personal Status (CSP), which abolished polygamy, required individual consent for marriage, and ended unilateral male divorce (talaq). This code made clear that the intellectual elites had usurped authority on family law from the ulama by instituting a secular alternative to shari’a.[1] The government passed other secular reforms at the time as well: it secularized the court system, dismantled the religious Zitouna University, and reformed the calendar to conform to Western dates.[2] These reforms effectively proclaimed the end of an era, ushering in a secular dictatorship under Habib Bourgiba and, later, Ben Ali, that would last until the recent Arab Spring.

An understanding of Tunisia’s experience with secularism makes apparent the need for representation of Islamist parties, illustrating that liberal reforms went hand in hand with political repression. Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s president from 1957 until 1987 also prohibited all Islamist parties and jailed dissenters. In an infamous affront to devoted Muslims, Bourguiba drank orange juice on television during Ramadan, implying that fasting impedes development. “We cannot advance… with an empty stomach”, he is reported to have said. In the eyes of Tunisian Islamists, this act became a symbol for his lack of respect for his country’s dominant religion: Tunisia is about 99 percent Muslim. Bourguiba’s successor, Ben Ali, proved similar, despite initial democratic reforms. Ben Ali stayed in power until the recent Jasmine Revolution, when he was exiled in January. Thus, for Tunisians, discussing the role of Islam’s relationship with the law is an expression of a newfound freedom that the country has not seen in over fifty years.

Al-Nahda’s history is one of struggle and resistance against Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s secular regimes. Many Al-Nahda leaders-to-be were members of the Society for the preservation of the Qru’an in the 1970’s. At that time, Ghannoushi’s journal Ma’rifa acted as a response to Bourguiba’s secularization of Tunisian society. Ghannoushi’s group organized under the Islamic Tendency Movement, which Bourguiba quickly banned.[3] From 1984-6, Prime Minister Mzali’s commitment to political reforms and greater openness led to the release of Ghannoushi and the other Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM) leaders.

Ben Ali became president in 1987 and returned much of ITM’s leadership to jail. However, shortly thereafter Ben Ali retracted his crackdown by instituting some moderate reforms, reinstituting the Muslim calendar alongside the Gregorian and the call to prayer on the radio, and releasing Ghannoushi in 1988 and allowing Mourou, the ITM’s second-in-command, to return from exile in Saudi Arabia. Still, Ben Ali feared the popularity of the Islamist movement. In 1989, Tunisia held parliamentary elections. The ITM changed its name to Al-Nahda so as to run candidates for office (parties could not have explicitly religious names or agendas). The elections showed that Al-Nahda represented a popular opposition to Ben Ali’s regime: Despite the government’s control over the media and likely corruption, Al-Nahda won an estimated 30% of the vote, drastically outpacing its secular liberal opponents. However, the government did not grant Al-Nahda any seats in the parliament.[4]

Following the elections, Ghannoushi imposed self-exile, leaving for Europe, from which he would not return until February, 2011. After his departure, Al-Nahda and the government ceased taking steps toward reconciliation. In Ghannoushi’s absence, and in response to the failed elections, the party radicalized under Ben Ali. In 1991, members of the party attacked the headquarters of the ruling party, Ben Alis’s Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), killing one person, and attacking others with acid. Ghannoushi, the party’s leader, insists that individuals perpetrated the acts without the party’s backing. Still, three weeks after these acts of violence, Mourou, the party’s second-in-command and a more moderate leader, left the party, indicating that the violence may in fact have been an explicit act.[5] In 1992, Ben Ali’s government rounded up many of Al-Nahda’s leaders and convicted them of planning acts of terrorism. It is unclear how much of the evidence was real, and how much was fabricated. In 1994, Michael Collins Dunn of the Middle East Institute argued that the evidence was largely reliable and that Al-Nahda had, in fact, become a violent movement.

The Western fear of the consequences of an Islamist take-over is not unfounded. It is inspired, in part, by the resulting oppression after the victory of several Islamist movements across the Middle East: the popular revolution in Iran in 1979 instituted shari’a law and limited women’s rights; the democratic victory for the Algerian Islamist party, the Front Islamique de Salut in 1992, devolved into a violent revolutionary force; in 1998 Hizbollah won a majority of Lebanon’s parliament; and the 2006 elections in Palestine resulted in Hamas, which for a long time did not recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel, winning overwhelming support. These Islamist movements illustrate a radical streak across the Middle East against some Western policies.

Additionally, some radical Islamist parties across the Middle East have taken violent and oppressive steps: For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan instituted murder as a punishment for adultery and banned girls from schools;[6] Al Qaeda advocates suicide bombing as a political tool and seeks to overthrow secular regimes by force and replace them with theocracies; the Al Saud regime in Saudi Arabia prohibits women from driving and enforces the wearing of the veil and abaya.[7] These movements are the face of Islamism to many in the West. But not all varieties of political Islam share the radicalism and violence of these movements.

Since Ghannoushi’s return to Tunisia in January, Al-Nahda has promised support for the democratic process and for human rights, along the lines of one of the region’s moderate, democratic Islamist parties – Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (abbreviated “AKP” from Turkish). Al-Nahda preaches a moderate interpretation of shari’a law, promising to maintain the ban on polygamy, make wearing the headscarf optional, and prohibit stoning or amputation as punishments. Indeed, Ghannoushi has written and spoken extensively for women’s rights in what he believes is a necessary step to embrace a demographic that other Islamist movements marginalized. Al-Nahda rejects more conservative Islamist approaches, like that propounded by Hizb al-Tahrir (the Freedom Party), which is now banned from Tunisia’s elections for advocating the instatement of an Islamic Caliphate.

The New York Times reported that Al-Nahda might be “cloaking fundamentalist intentions behind a moderate front,”[8] and in his speech about the Arab Spring on May 19, Obama cautioned that “real reform does not come at the ballot box alone” but must be tempered with protections of human rights and freedom of information. Indeed, some still associate Al-Nahda with the acts of violence perpetrated in the early 1990’s.

Al-Nahda may have some skeletons in its closet. It may be associated with a few, isolated acts of violence. But those who fear Islamism, warning against the oppression of women, persecution of minorities, and eventual demise of democracy, must recognize the many forms that Islamism can take. Al-Nahda is a moderate, and very popular, Tunisian party. This does not mean there is nothing to fear regarding democratic reforms, but it does mean that truly democratic reforms must embrace Al-Nahda.

For more information from a recent report on Al-Nahda, see Foreign Policy’s article by Marc Lynch, “Tunisia’s New Al-Nahda,” June 29th, 2011. http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/29/tunisias_new_al_nahda